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The international banking crisis: impact on 
Thailand’s financial system and policy responses  
Bank of Thailand 
1.   Impact on the banking system 
The direct impact of the global financial crisis on the Thai banking system has been very 
small in terms of the decline in lending of foreign banks operating locally and cross-border 
lending. This is due to Thailand’s very low reliance on foreign sources of funding as well as 
its low exposure to foreign assets. Foreign banks operating locally account for only 10% of 
the total assets of the banking system, while foreign funding accounts for only 3.5% of the 
total liabilities of the banking system. Stable domestic deposits form the core of the Thai 
banking system’s funding source, at around 77% of total liabilities. Moreover, 95% of bank 
loans to households, corporations, and the government sector were in local currency, thus 
mitigating any risk of currency mismatch.  
The lessons learned from the 1997 financial crisis, together with the strengthened risk-based 
supervision and risk management of banks, the countercyclical macroprudential measures in 
place since around 2003, and the removal of the fixed exchange rate regime in 1997, all 
contributed to reducing Thailand’s vulnerability and exposure to contagion associated with 
the global financial crisis. As can be seen from Table A below, the external debt of the Thai 
banking system is very small, at USD 7.7 billion, and the external debt to asset ratio of the 
banking system has fallen significantly from 18.8% in 1996 to 2.5% currently. In addition, 
banks have few foreign investment holdings, accounting for only 1% of total assets, while 
loans to overseas financial institutions and non-residents account for around 2.4% of total 
assets. 
The Thai banking model is not overly complex, comprising, predominantly, retail commercial 
banks, rather than the wholesale investment banking model, with a low leverage ratio and 
very low exposure to complex products or market risk. Most derivatives tend to be plain 
vanilla and are linked to underlyings such as international trade; thus, risk exposure is 
controlled through effective risk management. 
Foreign bank branches operating in Thailand were also resilient to the effects of the global 
financial crisis, as their head offices were robust, or they received strong support from their 
home regulators and government. Nevertheless, from industry dialogue carried out with 
these branches in the context of a financial stability review, it appears that, at the height of 
the crisis, just after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, foreign bank branches became 
increasingly risk-averse as part of the growing trend manifested by their head offices towards 
reducing global risk in order to conserve capital. This increased caution tended to be in terms 
of reducing exposure to new clients as well as corporates which were not at the top credit 
tier. However, this did not have a noticeable impact on credit availability for the local 
economy since most of the clients of foreign bank branches were multinational corporations 
with a very strong credit standing (eg automobiles, electronics, ICs). Since foreign bank 
branches were not the major source of bank credit to local companies, the increased caution 





 1996  2001  Q3/2009 
L/D ratio of banks    129.0
1 84.8  85.4 
Corporate D/E ratio
2    1.4
1 0.8  0.8 
External debt (bn USD)  108.7  67.5  65.9 
Of which, short-term  47.7  13.4  24.1 
Of which, banking system 41.9  9.4  7.7 
(% total bank assets)  18.8  6.3  2.5 
Of which, non-banking system 50.1  29.9  44.8 
External debt (% GDP)  65.9  56.1  25.8 
Reserve to short-term debt (times)  0.8  2.5  5.5 
1  Q2 1997.    
2  The median of D/E ratios of non-financial institutions listed on the Stock Exchange of Thailand. 
 
However, foreign banks are important players in the local over-the-counter (OTC) market for 
plain vanilla derivatives such as foreign exchange (FX) swaps and interest rate swaps, which 
were important for the risk management of local banks. Overall, however,  derivatives 
contracts offered by foreign bank branches have not been significantly affected by the crisis, 
although the development of new products, ie structured products, has slowed down 
somewhat. However, structured products form only a very small part of Thai banks’ business, 
which may be partly due to the Bank of Thailand’s cautious policy with regard to the scope of 
permissible derivatives business even prior to the global crisis.  
The outstanding volume of derivatives transactions across all banks in Thailand decreased 
slightly as of Q3 2009 compared to 2008, in line with both the contraction in key underlying 
transactions, namely the volume of exports and imports, and with international trade.  
1.1  Oversight of the stability of financial institutions’ systems and markets 
To ensure market stability and integrity, the Bank of Thailand (BOT) engages in close 
monitoring of and dialogue with the banking industry, both from the perspective of the BOT’s 
monetary policy and market operation conduct, as well as from the prudential supervision 
perspective. Its aim is to ensure that the market has adequate liquidity and capital, as well as 
the risk management ability to handle potential stress. The BOT also uses stress tests as an 
important tool to enhance the dialogue with the banking industry. This process, along with 
the adequate liquidity in the market, the robust condition of local banks and the fact that 
foreign banks operating in Thailand were resilient to the crisis either due to the robustness of 
their head offices, or because they were strongly supported by their home regulators and 
government, all contributed to the resilience of the local market. Of course, a key element of 
this resilience was the robust macroeconomic conditions prevailing in Thailand, particularly 
the current account surplus and strong international reserves position, which helped to 
underpin confidence in liquidity. 
All these factors have contributed to a more resilient banking sector. The Thai banking 
system continues to record a profit with robust capital, a greater provisioning cushion in line 
with the adoption of IAS39 for the fair valuation of non-performing loans (NPLs), and stable 
asset quality, and, in addition, the NPL and delinquency loan ratios continue to decline, 






1.2  Indirect impact via slowdown in global growth 
The negative impact of the global financial crisis came from the contraction in global growth 
and world trade, which caused a contraction in the Thai economy and loan growth. The 
economic slowdown led to a contraction in banking credit growth; loan growth decreased 
from 11.4% at end-2008 to –3.1% at end-September 2009, on a year-on-year basis. 
Corporate loans, which constitute 73.1% of total loans, contracted by 6.5%, in tandem with 
the economic slowdown. In contrast, consumer loans continued to grow, although 
decelerated somewhat to 7.3%. 
Given the global economic uncertainty, the BOT has asked banks to conduct stress testing to 
ensure that they are both alert to the potential impact of downside risks and are forward-
looking in their risk management approach. Recent stress testing, which covers credit, 
market and liquidity risks linked to macroeconomic scenarios, has confirmed the resilience of 
the Thai banking sector. 
2.  Impact on local money and debt markets 
As the Thai banking system had become more prudent following the 1997 financial and 
economic crisis, the recent global financial turmoil did not directly adversely affect the health 
of the banking system. There was no obvious direct negative effect on the domestic money 
market either. Thai baht (THB) liquidity remained abundant and short-term interest rates 
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Despite the limited impact on THB liquidity, there were some spillover effects on the FX swap 
market related to tightened USD liquidity conditions overseas. Reluctance to lend USD to 
other financial institutions due to credit risk concerns resulted in remarkably low implied THB 
swap rates during the first half of October 2008 (Figure 3). This unusual situation was 
temporary and did not destabilise the local FX market as the Thai private sector did not rely 
mainly on external debt financing (Figure 4).  
As for the unsecured lending market, during the peak of the crisis period, interbank 
transactions dropped slightly owing to heightened credit risk concerns among market 
participants. The daily average interbank volume decreased from THB 24 billion during the 
first half of 2008 to THB 13 billion in the second half. However, given the structural liquidity 
surplus in the Thai financial system, there were no difficulties in raising funds in the 
uncollateralised market and since January 2009 the daily average interbank volume has 
increased to THB 19 billion (Figure 5). 
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Conversely, secured lending transactions (private repo and sell–buyback), increased 
moderately towards the end of 2008. They have continued to grow significantly since mid-
2009 onwards, mainly due to the BOT’s plans to enhance the development of the private 
repo market (Figure 6).  
Figure 6 
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Regarding the local debt market, the Thai Government had no difficulty in raising funds 
through the domestic bond market. However, heightened credit risk concerns led to higher 
risk premia, as evidenced by the rising credit default swap (CDS) spreads. Nonetheless, 
regional countries’ sovereign bond spreads subsequently stabilised and retreated back to the 
normal range in mid-2009 (Figure 7). 
Figure 7 




























































































































3.   The central bank’s policy responses to the recent crisis 
3.1   Central bank instruments to deal with the crisis 
During the recent crisis, the BOT did not implement additional monetary measures to inject 
THB liquidity into the financial system. Thailand’s open market operations and end-of-day 
standing facility under the existing framework functioned rather effectively in managing 
money market liquidity, as reflected by short-term money market rates moving in line with the 
policy rate. 
As regards the end-of-day standing facility under the existing framework, this liquidity 
adjustment window was designed to meet frictional funding needs both for normal and 
stressed market conditions. It is accessible to a wide range of counterparties, virtually all of 
which are deposit-taking institutions. The BOT has emphasised to market participants that 
there is no stigma attached to the use of the facility.  
In addition, the BOT has prepared the contingency liquidity provision plan to ensure that 
there is sufficient liquidity for financial institutions. 
3.2   Measures taken to support interbank lending in local currency and/or to 
support foreign currency refinancing of banks/corporations 
Due to USD scarcity in the global market and unreliable indicators for USD funding costs, the 
market began to move away from using a FX swap rate; i.e. THBFIX reference rate. Instead, 384  BIS Papers No 54
 
 
major market participants began to use the Bangkok interbank offered rate (Bibor) more 
actively as a short-term benchmark because it was more stable and reliable (Figure 8).  
Figure 8 
Policy rate, three-month THBFIX and three-month Bibor 
 
 
In addition, the BOT has continually encouraged the development of private repo markets as 
it deems that a collateralised repurchase transaction imposes better risk management on 
participants’ financing activities in terms of credit, legal and market risk arrangements. It is 
also more consistent with international practice. 
As for measures to support foreign currency funding, the BOT has established bilateral swap 
agreements with other regional central banks, namely the Bank of Japan, the Bank of Korea 
and the People’s Bank of China, within the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI), in order to help 
facilitate short-term liquidity management in case of an emergency among regional countries. 
The facilities have not yet been activated as Thai financial institutions are not highly 
dependent on foreign financing and hence were not severely impacted during the recent 
crisis. However, the financial turmoil has highlighted the importance of bilateral swap 
arrangements among central banks.  
3.3   The BOT’s monetary policy responses to an international financial crisis 
The BOT has made it clear to the market that the monetary policy stance would be shifted 
should the turmoil impose threats on the real economy and the economic growth outlook. 
Therefore, when economic data in the third quarter of 2008 pointed towards a noted 
slowdown in economic activity and a much weaker economic outlook via a significant decline 
in exports, the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) decided to lower the policy rate, initially by 
100 basis points (bp) and altogether by 250 bp over a period of four months from December 
2008 to April 2009.  
Moreover, the crisis did not put notable depreciation pressure on the Thai baht. Incidentally, 
the Thai currency was relatively stable compared to major and other regional currencies BIS Papers No 54  385
 
 
because capital outflows were only moderate. Thai banks and corporations were neither 
heavily leveraged nor significantly exposed to foreign liabilities. Consequently, there were no 
concerns over excessive THB depreciation, and the issue did not act as a constraint to 
interest rate cuts. 
3.4   The BOT’s view on the role of FX reserves and interventions 
The BOT’s view on the role of FX reserves and interventions remains unchanged. The 
response to FX market volatility is consistent with the managed floating exchange rate 
regime adopted under the inflation targeting framework. FX intervention, which resulted in 
excess domestic liquidity, is fully sterilised to avoid any inflationary effect. Thus far, despite 
prolonged excess liquidity conditions, inflation developments have been well contained and 
core inflation remains well within the target band. 
Moreover, the recent crisis has shown that FX reserves played a vital role as the first line of 
defence to help ease the impact of an exchange rate shock.  
3.5   Other government measures  
The Thai Government also implemented various measures to support financing for both bank 
and non-bank corporations. For instance, in order to restore public confidence in the Thai 
banking system, the government decided on 28 October 2008 to extend the blanket deposit 
guarantee scheme to August 2011. Initially, the blanket deposit guarantee scheme that had 
been in place since February 2008 was to be gradually replaced by a partial guarantee 
scheme beginning in 2010.  
On 17 February 2009, through the Small Business Credit Guarantee Corporation (SBCG), 
the government approved the portfolio guarantee scheme for small- and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs). Under this scheme, the SBCG partially guarantees commercial banks’ 
SME loan portfolios. The credit guarantee limit is set at THB 40 billion for a period of five 
years with a fee of 1.75%, which is waived for the first year. The loss incurred by the SBCG 
will be compensated by the government within a limit of THB 2 billion.  
Moreover, on 5 August 2009, the Cabinet approved the credit fast track project, the aim of 
which is to accelerate the credit approval procedures of seven state banks in order to offset 
the reduction in commercial banks’ credit extension. Total credit for 2009 under this project is 
targeted at THB 927 billion. The government also set out its plans to recapitalise certain 
government specialised financial institutions (SFIs) in order to enhance their credit extension 
capacities. 